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Abstract 
Pan I of Ibis Artic\e considers Ibe role played by Ibe preliminary ruling procedure in the 
context of the Community legal system as a whole. Pan II discusses the types of questions that 
may be apj>ropriately referred to Ibe Court for preliminary ruling. Part III examines Ibe various 
tribunals and courts that may malee a reference to Ibe Court of lustire. Part N anaIyzes Ibe tension 
in Ibe relationship between the Court and the national courts of the Member States. Finally. Pan 
V considers the legal effects of preliminary rulings. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The judicial function in the Community is divided be-
tween the national courts of the Member States and the Court 
ofJustice (Court). I A national court has complete control over 
the proceedings pending before it and alone has jurisdiction to 
hand down the decision in those proceedings. It may be re-
quired to review questions of Community law relevant to the 
dispute. If in so doing it encounters difficulties, it may-and, 
in certain cases, it must-ask the Court for the necessary gui-
dance to resolve such difficulties. The preliminary ruling pro-
cedure under Artide 177 of the Treaty of Rome2 (EEC Treaty 
• Chief Law Clerk. Coun of Justice of the European Communities. All com· 
ment. made in thi. Anicle are persona!. 
This Anide draws heavily upon the observations made in the author's baol<, DAS 
VORABENTSCHEIDUNGSVERFAHREN NACH ARTIKEL 177 EWG-VERTRAG-EIN LEITFADEN 
FÜR DIE PRAxIS (1985). 
I. The drafters of the Treaties establishing the European Communities decided 
to entrust the tast.. of ensunng that "in the interpretation and application of thi. 
Treaty the Law is observed" to an independent judicial body. the Court of Justice. 
Treaty e.tablishing the European Economic Community, an. 164, Mn. 25, 1957, 
1975 Cr. Drit. T.S. No. I, at 55 (Cmd. 5179·11) (oflicial English Iransi.), 298 V.N.T.S. 
11 (1958) (unofliciaJ trans!.) [hereinafter EEC TreatyJ; Treoty instituting lbe Euro-
peon Coalond Steel Community (ECSq. an. 51, Apr. 18, 1951, 1975 Cr. Brit. T.S. 
No. I, at 29 (Cmd. !H89), 261 V.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty); Treaty estab· 
lishing lbe European Atomic Energy Commi.sion (EAEC). an. 156, Mn. 25, 1957. 
1975 Cr. Brit. T.S. 201 (Cmd. !>I79-II), 298 V.N.T.s. 167. By that decision, they 
made the concepts and principles of Community Iaw jusliciable. ond ot lbe same 
time, aclr.nowledged that Communily law constituted the foundation on which the 
«onomic and politicaJ unity of Europe was 10 be constructed. 
In olber word., the European Community was intended by its founden to be nOI 
merely an economic and sociaJ Community, not only a politicaJ organization based 
on lbe common history of European peoples, but also a legal CommunilY which pur-
sues ils broad aim. of integration within its own legal order. Thu. «onomic ond 
political activity, the dynamism of which was fully recognized, WlU brought under 
legal control and made subjecl 10 legislative objeclives. 
2. EEC Treaty, supra note I. art. 177. Artic1e 177 provides: 
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or Treaty) provides the mechanism for so doing. Under Arti-
cle 177. the Court provides an interpretation of the Commu-
nity law in question that is at once related to the facts and ab-
stract. A national court must then apply the law to the facts 
established by it in light of the Community law as interpreted 
by the Court. 
The procedure under Article 177 is intended to coordi-
nate the decisions of the national courts in the sphere of Com-
munity law. It is above a1l a means of ensuring the uniformity 
ofCommunity law. Additiona1ly. as an intermediate procedure 
in the proceedings pending before the national court, it has 
evolved into an important guarantee of individual rights in the 
Community. 
Since the early days of the Court, the preliminary ruling 
procedure has been a crucial element in its work. Although 
originally conceived as playing a relatively minor role. in the 
course of time the preliminary ruling procedure has become 
increasingly dominant. It has developed into a pillar of the 
Community legal order. One major reason for this is that the 
respective nationallaws and Community law increasingly influ-
ence and interact with each other and that economic and social 
activity in the Member States has been increasingly drawn into 
the Community field of action. It is characteristic of this devel-
opment that the most important legal decisions of the Court 
have been given in preliminary ruling proceedings. For exam-
pIe. the "major" judgments on direct applicability and on the 
supremacy of Community law or the leading decisions in the 
area of the free movement of goods and persons have been 
The Coun oe ]u.tice .hall have jurisdiction to give prelirninary rulings 
concerning: 
(a) the interpretation oe thi. Treaty; 
(b) the validity and interpretation oe acts oe the institutions oe the 
Community; 
(c) the interpretation. oethe .tatutes oebodies established by an aCl of 
the Council. where those statutes so provide. 
Where such a question is raised before any coun or tribunal oe a Mem-
ber State. that coun or tribunal may. if it considen that a decision on the 
que.tion i. neces.ary to enable it to give judgment. request the Coun oe 
]ustice to give a ruling thereon. 
Where any such question i. raised in a case pending before a coun or 
tribunal of a Member State. apinst whose deci.ions there is no judicial rem-
edy under nationallaw. that coun or tribunal .hall bring the matter before 
the Coun of Justice. 
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preliminary rulings. The infiuence of those judgments as a 
creative force and the precedents they set have contributed de-
cisively to the building of a coherent Community legal order 
with its own structure and principles.5 
In this Artide, I will altempt to show that notwithstanding 
a11 the alleged and actual imperfections and inadequacies, the 
preliminary ruling procedure has proved itself. Its effective-
ness and importance for the legal process have exceeded the 
most arnbitious expectations ofthe drafters ofthe Treaty. It is 
idle to speculate upon hypothetical developments. Through-
out this Article, however, 1 have suggested that without the 
procedure, Community law would not exist in its present form 
as the uniformly applicable and supreme Jus commune of the 
Member States. 
The Court's handling of questions referred to it some-
times arouses criticism and indignation among the national 
courts. Thus, the Court has been accused of taking too many 
liberties in construing or interpreting the questions referred to 
it and of thus ignoring the real problem and its relationship to 
tbe specific facts. Moreover, on occasion the impression is 
given that-contrary to the formal assurance that the national 
court bears responsibility for the judgment to be given in the 
case~-the Court is in reality not content to provide the na-
tional court with the legal ruling sought but also wishes to 'en-
sure the application of its decision to the dispute in the main 
proceedings. 
Insofar as shortcomings exist in the cooperation between 
the national courts and the Court of Justice-particularly re-
garding the submission of the reference and compliance with 
5. The important role of thc proccdure is rcllected in the sllltistics. A compari-
son of the numher of rcfcrcnces and direct action. that have becn brought bcforc the 
Court~c1uding stall' cases and applications for the adoption of interim mcasurcs-
.hows that approximatcly half the proceedings (1444 out ofa total 00016 case. in 
the period from 1953 to 1985) were preliminary ruling procecdings. If those /igures 
arc broken down, it bccomes c1ear that the procedure was used sparingly in the 
1960's (the /irst refcrcnce was made in 1961) but that afterwards, particularly sinee 
thc middle of the 1970's, reference. 10 the Court have considcrably incrcased. In 
1985, 139 rcqueslS ror preliminary rulings were regiSlered (as opposed to 229 dircct 
actions cxcluding stall' cases and applications for the adoption of interim mcasurcs). 
4. Set ease 53/79, ONPTS v. Damiani, 1980 E.C.R. 273, Comm. Mltt. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ -; Pigs Mktg. Bd. v. Redmond, ease 83/78, 1978 E.C.R. 2347, 2568, 
Comm. Mkl. Rcp. (CCH) , 8559. 
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the preliminary ruling-they appear to be technical rather than 
based on principle. Problems of principle arise oo1y in excep-
tional cases. It may be argued, however, that these difIiculties 
are, as a rule, more imagined than real. Thus, although in 
many cases there is still considerable reluctance among the na-
tional courts to use the procedure, the reservations appear to 
be rooted in an insufIicient knowledge or erroneous under-
standing of the mechanism of judicial cooperation. 
Part I of this Article considers the role played by the pre-
liminary ruling procedure in the context of the Community 
legal system as a whole. Part II discusses the types of ques-
tions that may be appropriately referred to the Court for pre-
liminary ruling. Part III examines the various tribunals and 
courts that may malte a reference to the Court of Justice. Part 
IV analyzes the tension in the relationship between the Court 
and the national courts of the Member States. Finally, Part V 
considers the legal effects of preliminary rulings. 
I. THE PREUMINARY RUUNG PROCEDURE IN THE 
COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM 
The Treaties of the European Communities list exhaus-
tively the proceedings that may come before the Court. Its ju-
risdiction is ratione materiae (competence d'attribution). Aside 
from the opinions conceming the extemal affairs of the Com-
munity,5 the proceedings may be divided into two main 
groups: direct actions and preliminary rulings. 
In direct actions, proceedings are brought by an applicant 
against a defendant. Thus, for example, the Commission or a 
Member State may bring an action before the Court against a 
Member State for infringement of the Treaty.6 Proceedings 
mayaiso be instituted for the annulment of a binding act of the 
Council or the Commission 7 or for failure to act in respect of a 
specific area of activity of the Council or the Commission.8 
The action for damages9 allows for claims arising out of the 
Community's noncontractual liability. In competition cases, 
5. EEC Treaty, $II/>'D note I, art. 228(1). 
6. Id. an •. 169, 170. 
7. Id. ans. 175, 174. 
8. Id. an. 175. 
9. 14. an. 178. 
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undenakings can bring actions against the decisions of the 
Commission in its capacity as the European artel authority.IO 
Finally, the Coun setdes disputes between Community officials 
and their appointing authority.11 
Tbere are major differences between those proceedings 
and preliminary ruling proceedings with regard to hoth the 
rules goveming those proceedings and their function in the 
Community system oflegal protection. Tbe preliminary ruling 
procedure is not an independent procedure but merely a stage 
in the proceedings pending before the national court, in which 
the Court gives a "preliminary" ruling on certain questions 
which have arisen in the main proceedings. Ordinary concepts 
of adversariaI procedure, such as standing and admissibility, 
the merits of an action, the rules of evidence. and res judicata 
are not relevant .. 
Under the Treaties, individuals are in principle not enli-
tled to bring actions directly challenging the legislative meas-
ures of the Community institutions before the Court. Tbey 
must institute proceedings in the national courts against imple-
menting measures adopted by the national authorities. It is 
therefore all the more important to enable the national court 
to ask the Court to provide it with guidance in making its deci-
sion with regard to questions of Community law. Thus the 
Court of Justice is able at the same time to review the validity 
of a Community rule which has been challenged by individuals 
who may not themselves bring an action to have that measure 
declared void. In that respect the procedure under Anicle 177 
fulfills the same function in the system oflegaI protection as an 
action for a declaration of nullity. At least to some extent it 
cancels out the restrictions which Article 173 of the EEC 
Treaty imposes on the right to bring an action. 12 
Tbe preliminary ruling procedure shares certain common 
features with appeal proceedings. In addition to a funetion of 
10. Id. an. 172. 
11. Id. an. 179. 
12. N.V. Internationale Crediet • cn Handelovcrcniging 'Roucrdam' 81: Oe 
Coöperatievc Suikerfabriek co Raffinaderij G.A. Puuershoek v. Minister van 
Landbouw en Visserij (Nethcrlands Minister of Agriculture and YlSherics) (IWO refer-
ence. for a prc\iminary ruling by the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijslevco). 
Joined Cases 73 Be 74/63, 1964 E.C.R. I, 22, Comm. Mlr.t. Rep. (CCH) 1- (opinion 
of Advocate General Roemer). 
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legal protection. it fulfills an important function of coordina-
tion. It differs from appeal proceedings. however. inasmuch as 
it is not intended to correct previously adopted decisions. but 
to provide national courts. before they deliver their judgments, 
with useful indications as to the substance of the applicab1e 
Community law. Consequently. the procedure is not based on 
the principle of a jucicial hierarchy with lower and higher 
courts but on the principle of the coordination of the activity of 
courts of equal standing in pursuit of their common task: to 
ensure that Community law is observed in every area of soci-
ety.ll! 
The power of the Court to implement Community law is 
limited. Such implementation is generally a matter for the 
Member States (indirect implementation), unless the Treaties 
or secondary Community legislation provide for implementa-
tion by the Community institutions themselves (direct imple-
mentation). Apart from the internal regulations for the Com-
munity institutions and their staff. there are few examples of 
direct implementation. 14 The vast m~ority of Community 
legislation is implemented hy the authorities of the Memher 
States.l~ 
Because the implementing measures of national adminis-
trations must be challenged under national law, matters of 
Community law corne before the national courts and are within 
their jurisdiction. In principle. they are free to interpret and 
apply the relevant Community law as independent courtS.16 In 
Ill. The preliminary ruling procedure cannot. however, be compared to an advi-
sory opinion. which serves as a prevcntivc review oflegality. lt do"s not clarify hypo-
thetical legal questions, but provides the national court with assistance in making ils 
decision in a specific case pending before il. Set infra text accompanying note 64. 
14. They include competilion law. EEC Treaty, supra note I, arts. 85-91. the 
rutes on State aids, id., art. 92-94, and the rules on steel quolaS, ECSC Treaty, mJno 
note I, art. 58. 
15. Examples are the Common CUSloms Tariff. the complex rules goveming the 
agricultural markets (Ievie. and refunds, the collection and payment of monetary 
compensatory amounts and so on) or the rules on the free movement of person. 
(including .odal security Iaw, the right of establishment and the freedom to provide 
service.). 
16. Rewe-Zentralfinanz ce 8< Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer für 
das Saarland, Case lIlIl76, 1976 E.C.R. 1989, 1997, Com",. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 118582. 
"Applying the principle of co-operation laid down in Article 5 of the Treaty. il is the 
national courts which are entrustee! with ensuring the legal protection which citizens 
derive from Ibe dircct effect ofthe provision. ofCommunity law." 111. para. 5. 
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other words the national court is the "ordinary" court of Com-
munity law with respect to all directly applicable rules of Com-
munity law. 
In view of the fact that both the Court and the national 
courts are required to interpret and apply Community law, it is 
immediately c1ear that the decisions given would not be consis-
tent without a central court to provide a uniform interpreta-
tion. Differenees in legal methods and divergent legal eon-
cepts in the individual Member States could lead to differing 
views as to the relevance of directly applicable Community leg-
islation and, in eertain circumstances, as to the substanee of 
the Community law held to be relevant. Differences can occur 
particularly where the scope and intention of national law are 
different from that of Community law, or where the expres-
sions used in the various official languages have different 
meanings. 
In national judicial systems, the uniformity of the law is 
ensured by the hierarchical structure of the courts. 17 Funda-
mental considerations of legal policy make that solution im-
possible in the Community sphere. The European Community 
was conceived as-and is, in its present stage of develop-
ment-an entity which is not intended to resemble aState. 
Rather, it is a union of States founded upon the transfer of 
sovereign rights in limited areas. In such an organization it 
would not be possible to develop a judicial structure resem-
bling that of the national legal orders. 
Article 177, therefore, represents a compromise that con-
siders the special features of the relationship between the 
Community legal order and the national legal orders of the 
Member States. It does not turn the Court into a European 
appeals court or court of cassation. Rather, it institutionalizes 
the requisite coordination and cooperation between that Court 
and the national courts by assigning to the Court the task of 
c1arifying in advance in intennediate proceedings questions of 
Community law which the national courts consider relevant to 
their decision. It does not establish a hierarchical relationship 
between the national courts and the Court of Justice. 
17. Cf C. WRlCIIT, THELAWOFFEOERALCoURTS 1-21 (4thed.198'> (discu5sion 
offederaljudicial system in the Vnited States). 
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11. QUESTIONS FOR PREUMINARY RULINGS 
Artide 177 limits the field of application of the prelimi-
nary ruling procedure strictly to rules of Community law so 
that nationallawas such can never be the subject of a prelimi-
nary ruling. The Court may neither interpret nationallaw nor 
consider whether it is valid or applicable. In that respect the 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that under Article 177 it has 
no jurisdiction to interpret or review legal measures and provi-
sions of national law,I8 much less assess the facts established 
by the national court. 19 
A. Measures Subject w Review 
The first paragraph of Artide 177 expressly distinguishes 
between two types of questions that may be referred to the 
Court: questions of validity, i.e., the existence of Community 
law, and questions of interpretation, i.e., the context of Com-
munity law. The latter category can relate to the Treaty, the 
acts of the institutions of the Community, and the statutes of 
bodies established by an act of the Council. On the other 
hand, questions concerning validity can relate only to the acts 
of the institutions of the Community. However, hoth types of 
questions pursue the same fundamental aim: the review of 
Community rules in light of the requirements and the specific 
aims of the Community legal order. Thus, a national court is 
provided with the means of applying Community law correctly 
in the proceedings pending before it.20 
By "Treaty," the drafters of Artide 177 implied not only 
the treaty provisions but also the annexes, amendments, and 
Treaties of Accession of the Member States. Tbe "acts of the 
institutions" of the Community, on the other hand, represent 
18. E.g .• Fonderie Ollicine Riunite (FOR) v. Vereinigte Kammgarn. Spinner. 
eien (VKS), Case 54/72, 1975 E.C.R. 195.205. Comm. Mb. Rep. (CCH) 18208; 
Carmine Capolongo v. Azienda Agricola Maya, Case 77/72, 1973 E.C.R. 611, 622, 
Comm. Mb. Rep. (CCH) '18213. . 
19. Ordre des Avocato au Ban-eau de Paris v. Onno Klopp, Case 107/85. 1984 
E.C.R. 2971, 2988, Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH) , 14,116 (reference for preliminary 
ruling from ehe French Cour de Cassation); Mr. &: Mn. F. v. Belgian State, Gase 
7/75,1975 E.C.R. 679, 689, Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH) '14656.536 (preliminary ruling 
requested by ehe Tribunal du Travail de NiveUes). 
20. Demag AG v. Finanzamt Duisburg • Süd, Cue 27/74, 1974 E.C.R. 1037, 
1046, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) , 8288 (preliminary ruling requested by ehe 
Finanzgericht Düsse1dorf). 
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"secondary" Community law, or those legal measures--other 
than merely internal measures-adopted by the institutions 
and other bodies of the Community. That law includes the 
measures set forth in Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, namely 
regulations, directives and decisions. Recommendations and 
opinions are not legally binding and, as such, are not covered 
by Article 177. Their interpretation may, however, become 
relevant in connection with other provisions, such as the duty 
to respect the objectives of the Community under Article 5 of 
the EEC Treaty. 
Secondary Community law also includes. international 
treaties that are concluded by the Community with nonmem-
ber countries or international organizations. According to an 
established principle laid down by the Court they form "an in-
tegral part of Community law."21 The same holds true for 
agreements, such as the General Agreements on Tariffs and 
Trade,22 which were concluded by the Member States, but 
whose terms now fall within the competence of the Commu-
nity. Such agreements are treated in the same way as agree-
ments concluded by the Community itself, and therefore form 
part of Community law, because the Community has taken 
over from the Member States the obligations arising out of 
those agreements.25 
Like internationalIawand the legal orders of most Mem-
ber States, the Community legal order is not limited only to 
the rules of positive law, but also embraces general principles, 
including especially, fundamental human rights. The Court 
21. R. &: V. Haegeman v. Belgian Slale, Case 181nS, 1974 E.C.R. 449, 460, 
Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH) , 827S (prelimina'1' ruling requested by Tribunal de pre-
miere instance de Bruxdles); see also HauplZollaml Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg el 
Cie.KC a.A., Case 104/81, 1982 E.C.It. 3641, 3662, Comm. Mltl. Rep. (CCH) ,8877 
(reference for preliminary ruling from Bundesfinanzhof). 
22. The General Agreement on Tarifti and Trade, tJ/Ifn4d tOT signaIuTr Oct. SO, 
1947,61 Sial. AS, A7, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,55 V.N.T.S. 187. 
23. Societa Italiana per I'Oleodotlo Tran.a1pino (SIOn v. Minislero della Ma-
rina Mercantile, Circoscrizione doganale di Trieste .. Enle AUlonomo del Ponodi 
Triesie, Ca.e 266/81, 1985 E.C.R. 7'1, 780, Comm. Mb. Rep. (CCH) , 14,001 (re(-
erence for prclimina'1' ruling from the Corte Suprcma di Cassazione); Douaneagent 
der NV Ncdcrlandse Spoorwegen v. Inspecteur der invoerrechlen cn accijnzen, Ca.e 
'8n5, 1975 E.C.R. 1459, 1450, Comm. Mkl. Rep. (CCH) , 8S27 (preliminary ruling 
requesled by Tarief commi.uie); International Fruil Co. v. Produklschep Voor 
Groenlen cn Fruil, Joined Cases 21-24n2, 1972 E.C.R. 1219.1228, Comm. Mkl. 
Rep. (CCH) , 8194. 
1987] ARTICLE 177 EEC TREATY 547 
has eonsistently reeognized that sueh principles form an inte-
gral part of Community law and are to be taken into eonsidera-
tion by it in reaehing its decisions.24 The Court has developed 
that position from the legal poliey whieh is expressed in the 
requirement, to which I have already referred, that the Court 
of Justice ensure that in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaties "the law is observed." It follows that questions 
concerning the existence or the content ofunwritten principles 
may be referred to the Court. 
A preliminary ruling may not concern the compatibility of 
national law with Community law, which roust take prece-
dence. However, the Court generally construes such questions 
to mean that the national court is "essentially" seeking criteria 
for the interpretation of the relevant Community law so that it 
can itself rule on compatibility.2.5 Accordingly, it has always 
striven to provide the national court with an interpretation of 
Community law that corresponds to the particular features of 
the main proceedings, and on which the national court can rely 
in applying national law in accordance with the requirements 
of the Community legal order. 
B. Validity and Interpretation 
As I have already discussed, Article 177 of the Treaty dis-
tinguishes between the review of validity and interpretation. 
While an Community law irrespective of its legislative status 
and hierarchical rank can be the objeet of arequest for inter-
pretation, only "the acts of the institutions of the Community" 
within the meaning of subparagraph (b) of the first paragraph 
24. Lise10tte Hauer v. Land Rheinland·Pfalz, Cast 44n9, 1979 E.C.R. 5727, 
5744-43, Comm. Mkt. Ilep. (CCH) , 8629 (pre\iminary ruling reque.ted by the 
Verwaltung'sgericht Neustadt);). Nold, Kohlen- und Baustolfgross.handlung v. Com· 
mission, Case 4/7S, 1974 E.C.R. 491,507, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 11162.31; Inter· 
nationale Handels GmbH v. Einfuhr· und Vorrats.telle für Getreide und Futtermit· 
tel, Gase IlnO, 1970 E.C.R. 1123, 1184, Comm. Mkl.llep. (CCH) Cj 8126 (r"fermee 
for preliminary ruling by VerwaJtungsgerieht Frankfun); Stauder V. City ofUlm. Sozi· 
alamt, Gase 29/69, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 425, Comm. Mb. llep. (ceH) '8077. 
25. Minister., Public v. Xavier MirepoilC, Gase 34/85, 1986 E.C.R. -. Comm. 
Mltt. Rep. (ceH) • 14,520 (intetpretation of Aniele SO 10 determine whether na-
tional leplation prohibiting the use of a pesticide is eompatible with Community 
law); Minister., Publie ofLuxembourg v. Madeleine Hein, nee Muller, Case IOn., 
1971 E.C.R. 725, 729. Comm. Mltt. Rep. ICCH) 1 8140 (referenee for preliminary 
ruling by Tribunal d'arrondissement of Luxembourg). 
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of Article 177 can be the subject of a preliminary ruling review-
ing their validity. 
Validity corresponds to legaIity.26 However, it is striking 
that the Treaty refers to legaIity in connection with actions for 
a declaration of nullity under Article 173 of the Treaty, but 
not, however, in relation to the preliminary ruling procedure. 
There are in fact clear functionaI differences between an action 
under Artide 173 and the review of validity in a preliminary 
ruling procedure. Such differences are related to the different 
objectives of the procedures. In contrast to an action under 
Article 173, a preliminary ruling procedure is not intended pri-
marily as a means of reviewing specific acts of the Community 
institutions, but rather as a means of informing the national 
court of the state of applicable law. Those different ai~s are 
clearly reftected in the fact that arequest for a review of valid-
ity in preliminary roling proceedings is not restricted by a time 
limit and is subject to no restrictions regarding the persons cn-
titled to bring an action. 
Interpretation is, in accordance with normallinguistic us-
age, the ascertaining of the content and the importance of a 
specific role. That includes the question of the duration of the 
validity of the measure in question. The fact that the provi-
sions of Community law are published in several languages 
means that all relevant versions in the different official lan-
guages (nine at present) are to be compared on an equal ba-
sis.27 
26. See. t.g .• Westzucker GmbH v. Einfuhr - und V"rratsstelle fiir Zucker, Case 
57/72, 1973 E.C.R. 321, 336, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) , 8211 (preliminary ruling 
requested by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof Hessen) (in which the Court referred to the 
"Iegality of!hat measure" in reviewing the validity of a Commission Regulation); su 
als. Deuka, Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH BJ. Stolp v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für 
Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 78/74, 1975 E.C.R. 421, Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH) , 
8302; Deuka, Deutsche Kraftfutter GmbH BJ. Stolp v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für 
Getreide und Futtermittel, Case 5/75, 1975 E.C.R. 759, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH), 
8313 (preliminary rulings requested by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof and the Verwal-
tungsgericht Frankfurt, respectively); l"tematioM.k Handel GwtbH, Case 11/70, 1970 
E.C.R. 1125, Comm. MkL Rep. (CCH) • 8126. 
27. E.g., Knud Wendelhoe, Forening af Arbejdsledere i Danmark (Ass'n of Su-
pervisory Staft", Denmarkl, Handels-og Kontorfunktionaeremes Forbund i Danmark 
(Union or Commercial Be ClericaI Employees) v. LJ. Music ApS, Case 19/8S, 198!'> 
E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) , 14,179 (para. 13 of the judgment); H.B.M. 
Abels v. The Administrative Board of the Bedrijfs Vereniging voor de Metaalindustrie 
en de Electrotechnische Industrie (Professional &: Trade Ass'n for the Meta! &: Elec-
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Tbe Court has attached great importance to a schematic 
and teleological interpretation based on the aims of the Treaty 
and the principle of the effectiveness (e.ffet utile) of Community 
rules.28 That interpretative method has had a profound effect. 
Thus, in particular, the Court has been able to develop the law 
creatively by filling lacunae (gaps). Tbe method consists es-
sentially in relying on general principles and actions of law to 
determine the meaning of. in particular, obscure legal con-
cepts. At the same time, the Court has inferred from the prin-
ciple of a unified Community legal order that its individual 
provisions are to be interpreted, as far as possible, so as to 
avoid conflict with other Community law provisions. 
A characteristic feature of the Court's interpretative meth-
odology is the deveiopment of a scheme of rules and excep-
tions. In other words, it applies the maxim that the fundamen-
tal principles ofthe Common Market and, in particular, the ba-
sic freedoms provided for in the EEC Treaty (e.g., movement 
of goods, movement of persons, freedom to provide services 
and free movement of capital) are to be interpreted broadly, 
while exceptions to and restrietions on those freedoms are to 
be interpreted strictly.29 That rule represents a clear reversal 
of the traditional precept of international law stating that 
clauses in international treaties which restrict States' freedom 
trotechnicallndustries), Case 1~5/8S, 1985 E.C.R. -. Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) , 
14.176; Stauder, Ca.e 29/69.1969 E.C.R. 419,424, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) , 8077. 
28. S .. , •. g., D.M. Levin v. Staatssecretaris vanJustitie, Case 5.!1/81, 1982 E.C.R. 
10S5, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) , 8821 (reference for preliminary ruling from the 
Netherlands Raad van State) (right o(residence); Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societe 
Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, Ca." 4S/75, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8.!146 (preJiminary ruling requested by the Cour du travail 
Brussels) (equal pay Cor men and women); Commission v. Council, Ca,,, 22/70, 1971 
E.C.R. 26~, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) , 81M (power ofthe Community in external 
relations); N.V. Aigemene Transpon-en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend Be 1.oos v. 
Nederlandse administratie der belastingen (Netherlands Inland Revenue Administra-
tion), Case 26/62, 1965 E.C.R. 1,24, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8008 (the question 
of direct applicabiliIY). 
29. SN, •. g., Simmenthal SpA v. Italian Minister ror Finance, Case ~5/76, 1976 
E.C.R. 1871, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8~88 (preliminary ruling requested by the 
Pretore of Susa); Roland Rutili v. Minister Cor the Intenor, Case 36/75, 1975 E.C.R. 
12 J 9, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) , 8~22 (preliminary ruling requested by the Tribunal 
administratif Paris); Yvonne van Duyn v. Home ORice, Case 41174, 1974 E.C.R. 
1537, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 828.!1 (preliminary ruling requesled by the Chan-
cery Division of the High Court of Justice); Commis.ion v. Government oe the Italian 
Republic, Cas" 7/61, 1961 E.C.R. 317, Comm. Mb. Rep. (CCH), 8001. 
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of action are to be interpreted restrictive1y. By a varied and 
systematic application of that rule, the Court has been able, in 
the conßict between the requirements of the Community Trea-
ties and the restrictive effects of national politics, to give prece-
dence to the former. 
Interpretation is to be distinguished from the application 
of Community law, as interpreted by the Court, to the estab-
lished facts. Under the pre1iminary ruling procedure, the ap-
plication of Community law is the sole responsibility of the na-
tional court. That is dear both from the wording of Article 
177,which-in contrast to Article 164-refers merely to the 
interpretation and not to the application of Community law, 
and from the function of the preliminary ruling procedure, 
which is based on a strict division of duties between the na-
tional court and the Court of Justice. Thus the Court has re-
peatedly stated that in preliminary ruling proceedings it has no 
jurisdiction to decide the main proceedings. It cannot rule on 
the application of the Community law in question to the spe-
cmc case.50 
That may sometimes lead to practical difficulties, since the 
Court's interpretation can provide real assistance in the deci-
sionmaking process of the national court only if it is sufficiently 
related to the particular features of the specific case. In that 
context the Court must take into account two opposing re-
quirements. It must provide a sufficiently dear legal opinion 
that can be directly applied to the case in question, while 
avoiding at all costs anything that could be regarded as inter-
ference with the national courfs prerogative of deciding the 
dispute before it. It must be particularly careful in cases in 
which not all the facts are available or where the national court 
has a certain discretion.'1 
30. F1aminio Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585. Comm. Mlr.t. Rep. 
(CCH) 11 8025 (request for a preliminary ruJing by the Giudice Conciliatore di Mi· 
lano); Da Costa eil Schaalr.e N.V., Jacob Meijer N.V. &: Hoechsl • Holland N.V. v. 
Nederlandse BelaSlingadministralie,Joined Cases 28-50/62, 1965 E.C.R. 51, Comm. 
Mkl. Rep. (CCH) • 8010 (reference for preliminary ruling by the Tariefeommissie). 
31. Sn, .. g., Codilel S.A. Compagnie Generale pour la Diffusion de Ia Television 
v. Cine - Vog Films SA, Case 262/81,1982 E.C.R. 3581, 3402, para. 18, Comm. Mkl. 
Rep. (CCH) • 8865 (referenee for preliminary ruling from Cour de Cassation of the 
Kingdom of 8elgium); Criminal Proccedings againn Timothy Fredericlr. Robertson, 
Case 220/81, 1982 E.C.R. 2349, 2561, para. 15, Comm. Mkl. Rep. (CCH) '8851 
(referenee for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunal de Premiere In'taner, Brus-
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III. THE NATIONAL COURTS 
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With respect to the bodies qualified to make a reference to 
the Court, Article 177 establishes in the first place an institu-
tional definition, i.e. that any body of a Member State which 
possesses the status of a court or tribunal may make a refer-
ence to the Court. However, the above definition must be 
qualified by a functional element, because a reference is only 
admissible when it is made in connection with the judicial ac-
tivity of the court or tribunal. 
A. TM Institutional Definition 
A request for a preliminary ruling may only be made by a 
"court or tribunal of a Member State."!2 Tbe expression 
"court or tribunal" would present no difficulties ifit meant any 
body which is desCribed as a court or tribunal under national 
law. However, adefinition by reference to the legal order of 
the Member States would be unsatisfactory. Indeed, Article 
177 envisions an independent Community law concept, to be 
defined by a comparison of the various legal orders of the 
Member States in accordance with the aims and the purpose of 
the preliminary ruling procedure.55 
To qualify as a court or tribunal, a body's title is not im-
portant. Rather, its function and position in the relevant sys-
tem of legal protection are the deterrnining factors. If that 
were not the case, whole sectors of economic and social activity 
might be entirely or at least partially removed from the control 
of the Court. In that way, the aim, importance, and effect of 
the preliminary ruling procedure would be compromised. 
In accordance with a principle common to all the Member 
States, a court or tribunal must be an independent body, i.e., it 
must have jurisdiction to decide disputes and must not be sub-
ject to instructions. Tbe Court has adopted that principle by 
implication in a number ofpreliminary rulings. For instance, it 
has answered questions referred by the Italian "Pretore," a 
sels); CriminaJ Proceedings agaimt Anton Adriaan Fiege. Case 27/80. 1980 E.C.R. 
5859.5854. para. 12. Comm. Mb. Rep. (CCH) '8721 (preliminary ruling requelted 
by the Arrondissementsrechtbank AlSen). 
52. EEC Treaty. SUfmI note 1. art. 177. paras. 2. S. 
55. J. BoULOUIS .. R.-M. CHEVALLIER, 1 GRANDS ARIIETS DE LA COUR DEJUsnCE 
DES COMMUNA\1TES EUROPPNES 156-57 (1978). 
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kind of justice of the peace. Similarly, it has recognized that 
the following bodies are entitled to refer to it for a preliminary 
ruling: the Centrale Raad van Beroep, the College van Beroep 
voor het Bedrijfsleven and the Tariefcommissie (Netherlands), 
the National Insurance Commissioner (United Kingdom),'4 
and the Conseil d'Etat or Raad van State (Be1gium, France, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands). 
Indications as to what is meant by "court or tribunal" 
under Article 177 may be found in the judgment in Vaassen-
Gö'bbels,35 which concemed arequest for a preliminary ruling 
by the Scheidsgerecht van het Beambtenfonds voor het 
Mijnbedrijf. 36 The Court accepted the request because the tri-
bunal was properly constituted under Netherlands law, it was a 
permanent body charged with the settlement of disputes de-
fined in general terms in provisions that corresponded to those 
applying to ordinary courts. Moreover, its jurisdiction was 
compulsory and it was bound to apply rules of law. Thus, it 
was a "court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 177" 
and as such was entitled to refer to the Court for a pre1iminary 
ruling. 
Consequently, a court or tribunal within the meaning of 
Article 177 has the following procedural-and substantive at-
tributes: independence of the deciding body; a statutory basis, 
i.e., it must be a public body of the Member State concerned; 
its permanent character; its compulsory jurisdiction; the adver-
saria! nature of the proceedings before it; the fact that it must 
apply mIes of law. 
It follows from the grounds of the judgment in Vaassen-
Göbbels, a contrario, that pure1y private arbitration tribunals are 
not entitled to refer to the Court, particularly when they do not 
apply objective law, but decide disputes ex aequo el bono. Tbe 
Court reached that conclusion expressly in a more recent deci-
sion, Nordsee,37 which concerned a German arbitration tribunal. 
34. Thi. ja now the Social Security Commis.ioner. 
55. G. Vaassen (n« Göbbels) Management of the Beambtenfonds voor het 
Mijnbedrijf, Case 61/65, 1966 E.C.R. 261, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) f 8050 (refer· 
mee for a preliminary ruling by the Scheidsgerecht van het Beambtenfonds voor het 
Mijnbedrijf, Heer1m). 
56. This is the Arbitration Tribunal of the fund for non·manual worIr.en em· 
ployed in the mining industty. . 
57. Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefi5ch· 
erei Nordstern AG" Co. KG" !l-eederei Friedrich, Case 102/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1095, 
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The Court held that the tribunal in question had certain fea-
tures of a genuine court, i.e., that the arbitration proceedings 
were conducted within the framework of the law, that the arbi-
trator had to decide according to the the law and his award 
had, as between the parties, the force of res judicata and would 
be enforceable ifleave to issue execution were obtained. How-
ever, those considerations were not sufficient to give the arbi-
tration tribunal the status of a "court or tribunal" within the 
meaning of Article 177. That was so because the parties in the 
main proceedings were free to specify in their contract whether 
they wished to use the arbitration procedure or to rely on the 
competent State courts to settle the dispute. Consequently, 
the German public authorities had not delegated to the arbitra-
tion tribunal the duty of ensuring compliance with the obliga-
tions arising under Community law. 
This decision appears to be of considerable practical im-
portance, because there is an increasing tendency in the Mem-
ber States to resort to private arbitration tribunals to settle dis-
putes relating to private law and, particularly, economic law. 
However, it must be added that the judgment emphasizes the 
particular features of the specific arbitration procedure in 
question and therefore does not necessarily mean that refer-
ences may not be made by arbitration tribunals in procedures 
conducted under different rules. 
Moreover, the grounds of the judgment expressly stated 
that references from State courts or tribunals related to arbi-
tration proceedings are admissible. That means that national 
courts are entirely free to refer to the Court, if they consider it 
necessary, in connection with the assistance they must provide 
to arbitration tribunals in certain cases, or in relation to any 
review of the arbitration decision which they may be called 
upon to carry out. Therefore, unsatisfactory consequences 
arising from the fact that private arbitration tribunals may not 
make a reference to the Court may to some extent be cor-
rected, inasmuch as the national courts may refer to the Court 
in connection with their participation in the adoption of an ar-
bitration decision or the enforcement of that decision. 
The judgment in Nordsee has, not surprisingly, produced 
Comm. MIr.t. Rep. (CCH) , 8822 (request for preliminary ru1ing from Walmer 
Richter, Pres. of Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Bremen, aroitrator). 
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lively reactions. Certain commentators regret that the Court 
of Justice does not ensure unreservedly the uniform applica-
tion of Community law in the increasingly important area of 
contractual arbitration. Tbe majority, however, note with ap-
proval that the judgment places limits on the possibility of ma-
nipulation of thepreliminary ruling procedure by private per-
sons. 
Questions of definition arise in particular with respect to 
professional bodies. In the first place, the Court has adopted 
as criteria the extent of State participation and the degree to 
which aState guarantees the independence of the body making 
the decision and confers legal effect on its decisions. In 
Broekmeul.en, it found that the Dutch appeals committee for gen-
eral medicine satisfied those requirements.58 On the other 
hand, in Borker, it took the view that the Conseil de L'Ordre 
des Avocats did not possess the requisite attributes since it was 
empowered only to deliver an opinion and not to decide 
cases.39 
B. The Functional Definition 
A reference may be made to the Court only when the na-
tional court considers adecision necessary to enable it "to give 
judgment." Hence, a reference may not be made by a court 
which, although qualified under Article 177, is acting in the 
specific case as an administrative authority rather than a judi-
cial body. Tbus, for example, where it is acting as an ap-
pointing authority or when it adopts an administrative mea-
sure, Article 177 does not apply. Measures ofthat type, which 
do not concernjudicial activity, do not representjudicial deci-
sions within the meaning of Artide 177. 
Initially, various commentators raised the question 
whether certain summary proceedings were compatible with a 
reference for a preliminary ruling in view of the speed with 
which they must be completed.40 In light of the Court's deci-
lIS. C. Broekmeulen v. Huisarts RegisU'atie Commissie, Ca.e 246/80, 1981 
E.C.R. 2l111, 2328, para. 17, Comm. Mtl. Rep. (ceH) , 87711 (reCerence Cor a prclim-
inary ruling from Ihe Commiss,e van Beroep Huisartsgeneeskunde, Tb., Hague). 
lI9. Jules Bork«, Case 138/80, 1980 E.C.R. 1975, Comm. Mkl. Rep. (CCH) , 
8705 (preliminary ruling requesled by lhe Conseil de l'Ordre des AvocalS a Ja Cour 
de Paris). 
40. The 111M of f1rt>CWIingt in which Ihr queslion 10 be submilted arises is, on the 
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sions, the answer is clearly affirmative. In a number of judg-
ments, the Court has both explicitly and implicitly confirmed 
that the urgency or the provisional character of such proceed-
ings cannot affect a court's right to make a reference to the 
Court when its decision is based on Community law.41 
Thus for example the judgments in Stauder,4'J. Deutsche 
Grammophon 4 '!. and Polydor44 concemed requests for prelimi-
nary rulings in connection with proceedings arising out of an 
interim order or injunction. Other judgments concemed ref-
eren ces from Italian courts in the pre-litigation stage of liqui-
dation proceedings or administrative proceedings.45 Tbe 
Court stated that "Article 177 does not make the reference to 
the Court subject to whether the proceedings at the conclusion 
of which the national court has drawn up the reference for a 
preliminary ruling were or were not defended. "46 Tbe same 
applies for an inquiry conducted by an examining magistrate, 
which inquiry under French law can precede the actual crimi-
other hand, not important, provided that the request Cor a preliminary ruling comes 
from a national court which is sitting in its judicial capacity. 
41. See, •. g., Holfmann-La Roche v. Centrafann Vertriebsgesellschaft 
Pharmazeulischer Erzeugnisse mbH, Case 107n6, 1977 E.C.R. 957. 972. paras. 3-4, 
Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH) 'I 8466 (preliminary ruling requested by the Ober-
landesgericht Karlsruhe); Set als. Elestina Esselina Christina Morson v. State of the 
Netherlands Sc Head of the Plaatselijlte Politie, Seuradjie Jhanjan v. Netherlands, 
Joined Cases 35 and 36/82, 1982 E.C.R. '723, 3754, Comm. Mb. Rep. (CCH) 1 
8876 (references from Hoge aaad der Nederlanden). 
42. Erich Stauder v. City oC Ulm, Sozialamt, Case 29/69, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 
Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH), 8077. 
4'. Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. Melro-SB-Grossrnärltte GmbH Sc Co. KG. 
Case 78/70, 1971 E.C.R. 487. Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH) .8106 (reference for apre-
Iiminary ruling by the Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg). 
44. Polydor ud. Sc RSO Records Inc. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd. k Simon. 
Records Lid., Case 270/80, 1982 E.C.R. '29, Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH) , 8806 (refer-
ence for a preliminary ruling from lhe Court of Appeal of England and Wales). 
45. E.g., Birra Dreher SpA v. Amminislrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, Case 
162n" 1974 E.C.R. 201, Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH) 11 8264 (preliminary ruling re-
quested by the Pretore di Roma); Riseria Luigi Geddo v. Ente nazionale Risi, Case 
2n" 197' E.C.R. 865, Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH) , 8219 (preliminary ruling re-
quested by Ihe Pretore di MUano); Politi S.A.S. v. Minisiry for Finance of the Ilalian 
Republic, Case 4Snl, 1971 E.C.R. 1059, Comm. Mit!. Rep. (CCH), 8159 (reference 
for a preliminary ruling by the President of Ihe Tribunale di Torino); Eunoma di 
POITO e C. v. Ministry ofEducation ofthe Italian Rep., Case 18171, 1971 E.C.R. 811, 
Comm. Mit!. Rep. (CCH) , 8148 (reference for a preliminary ruling by the Pres. of 
the Tribunal di Torino); SpA SACE v. Ministry ror Finance of the Italian Republic, 
Case S"70, 1970 E.C.R. 1215, Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH) " 8117 (reference for a 
preliminary ruling by the Tribunale, Brescla). 
46. Bi"" Imlllr, 1974 E.C.R. at 211, para. 3. 
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nal proceedings.47 A reference in connection with an objec-
tion raised in nonadversarial proceedings (e.g., against an or-
der issued by the Registrar of companies) has likewise already 
been the subject of a preliminary ruling.48 
Moreover, it follows from the principle of the division of 
jurisdiction between the national court and the Court ofJustice 
that it is not for the Court to determine "whether the decision 
whereby a matter is brought before it was taken in accordance 
with the rotes 0/ national law governing the organization 0/ the courts 
and their procedure."49 Thus, in Reina, the Court dismissed the 
objection that the Chamber of the Gennan administrative 
court to which the case had been assigned had made a refer-
ence to the Court without the participation oflay judges. This, 
it was claimed, was contrary to German procedural rules. The 
Court therefore considers a reference to have been properly 
made even when the national court is not properly constituted 
or when there has not been compliance with national provi-
sions in relation to the staying of the proceedings and the ref-
erence.50 
IV. THE RIGHT AND THE DUTY TO MAKE REFERENCES 
According to the second paragraph of Article 177, any 
court or tribunal of a Member State may make a reference to 
the Court of Justice when it considers that adecision on a 
question of the kind referred to in that article is "necessary to 
enable it to give judgment." Under the third paragraph of Ar-
ticle 177, on the other hand, only certain national courts are 
under a duty to refer questions to the Court, namely those 
"against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under na-
tionallaw." These phrases call for some clarification. 
47. Procureur de Ia Republique v. Rene Chatain, Casc 65n9, 1980 E.C.R. 1545, 
Comm. Mb. Rep. (CCH) , 8671 (preliminary ruling requested by the Tribunal de 
Grande Instance, Nanterre). 
48. Friedrich Haaga GmbH, Case '2n4, 1974 E.C.R. 1201, Comm. MItL Rep. 
(CCH) 1 8289 (preliminary ruling requested by the Bundesgerichtshof). 
49. Francesco Reina" Letizia Reina v. Landeskreditbank Baden· Württemberg, 
Case 65/81, 1982 E.C.R. 55,4', para. 7. Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 8790 (emphasis 
supplied). 
50. SM id. at 4', para. 8. 
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A. The Right to Make a Reference 
I. The Power of Appraisal of the National Courts 
Article 177 provides for direct cooperation between the 
Court of Justice and the national courts by means of a 
nonadversarial procedure. It follows from the cooperative na-
ture of this procedure that the decision whether or not to refer 
a question to the Court is a matter solely for the court hearing 
the case and not for the parties to the proceedings before it. It 
is also for that court alone to determine the content of the 
questions to be referred. The parties, or-where appropri-
ate-the State Prosecutor's Office, have no control over the re-
fermi of those questions or over their wording.S1 
The national court is therefore quite at liberty to make a 
reference to the Court even if the parties make no such re-
quest, or, when necessary, even if contrary to their expressed 
wish. Because this is a question of jurisdiction and thus falls 
within the area of public policy, the national court must be able 
to refer questions on its own motion. Furthermore, it would 
be contrary to good sense to prohibit it from referring ques-
tions to the Court simply because the issue concemed escaped 
the notice of the parties or because the parties wished to evade 
the application of Community Iaw. 
In general, a national court hearing an action will only 
make a reference to the Court ifit has a "question," that is, ifit 
considers the ruling of the Court necessary for its own deci-
sion. The making of a reference thus presupposes the exist-
ence of a "real difficulty which would arouse doubt in the mind 
of an open-minded observer."52 In general, such doubt only 
arises when the meaning and intent of a provision of Commu-
nity law are not clear from its wording and context, or if there 
are real or apparent lacunae in the text. In that case the mean-
ing of the text must be determined by means of an interpreta-
tive ruling, and the gaps in the applicable law filled. 
Justification for the making of a reference under the sec, 
ond paragraph of Article 177 is to be found, however, not in 
the existence of objective uncertainty or Iacunae in a provision 
51. Hcs.ismc KnappschaFt Y. Maison Singer cl fiIs. Case 44/65, 1965 E.C.R. 
965, 970, Comm. Mkl. Rcp. (CCH) , 8042 (rcfcrencc for a prcliminary ruling by thc 
Cour d'appcl, Colmar). 
52. 1 E. LAFFERJUDE, TRAm DE JualSPRUDENCE ADMlNJSTRATIVE 449 (1887). 
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of Community law but in the subjective view of the national 
court. 53 The important point is whether or not the national 
court decides whether it can ascertain with sufficient accuracy 
the existence and content of the rule of Community law in 
. question. National courts would therefore be weIl advised to 
avoid setting the threshold of doubt too high and to make the 
widest possible use of their right to make references, in order 
to preclude any possibility of divergence between their juris-
prudence and that of the Court ofJustice. In this regard, due 
attention must be given to the fact that Community regulations 
are adopted in severallanguages, to the complexity of the sub-
ject matter, and to the technical and systematic characteristics 
of Community law. 
The principle of procedural economy requires that the na-
tional court only refer a question to the Court ofJustice when 
it is certain that the question is relevant to deciding the action 
of which it is seised. Such a requirement also accords with the 
principle of mutual confidence and cooperation. 
The Court has consistently held that the relevance of the 
question referred is a matter exclusively for the national court 
hearing the action, which has a certain "power of appraisal" in 
that regard.54 Since it is responsible for the decision to be 
laken and in the context of that decision must apply the rele-
vant Community law to the specific case in hand, it alone is in a 
position to assess the necessity and relevance of the question 
referred. The Court is barred from making any such assess-
ment, if for no other reason than that otherwise it would have 
to delve extensively ioto questions of nationallaw. 
The Court of Justice has developed this principle particu-
larly clearly in recent cases. In the Damwni case,55 one of the 
parties to the main proceedings argued that the question re-
ferred was "inopportune" in view ofthe various arguments re-
lied on before the nationar court. The Court rejected this ar-
gument in the following terms: 
55. The conditions defining the extent of the duty to malr.e a reference under the 
third paragraph of Article 177 are different. 
54. Pasquale Foglia v. Mariella Novello. Case 244/80. 1981 E.C.R. 5045.lI062. 
para. 16. Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) , 8786 (Fogli4 v. Now/Io 11). 
55. Office National des Pensions pour Travailleurs Salaries (O.N.P.T.S.) v. Fi-
oravante Damiani. Case 55/79. 1980 E.C.R. 275. 281. para. 5. Comm. Mlr.t. Rep. 
(CCH) 11 - (request for preliminary ruling by Belgian Cour de Cassation). 
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It is not for this Court to pronounce on the expediency of 
the request for a preliminary ruling. As regards the division 
ofjurisdiction between national courts and the Court ofJus-
tice under Article 177 of the Treaty it is for the national 
court, which is alone in having a direct knowledge of the 
facts of the case and of the arguments put forward by the 
parties, and which will have to give judgment in the case, to 
appreciate, with full knowledge of the mauer before it, the 
re1evance of the question oflaw raised by the dispute before 
it and the necessity for a preliminary ruling so as to enable 
it to give judgment.56 
559 
For the same reasons, it is irrelevant from the point of 
view of Community law at what stage of the main proceedings 
the reference is made. For reasons of procedural economy, 
the national court should of course malte the reference only at 
a stage of the proceedings after the relevant facts have been 
ascertained to a large extent and it is able properly to assess 
the expediency of the question to be referred. Such considera-
tions are, however, a matter for the national court alone. 
The national court's right to refer questions to the Court 
of J ustice regarding the validity and interpretation of Commu-
nity law is wide in scope and flows directly from the Treaty. As 
such, it cannot be restricted by the nationallegislature. In that 
regard Article 177 is jus cogens. The question of the scope of 
the right to make a reference is not entirely free of difficulty, 
however, because preliminary reference proceedings are 
merely an interlocutory stage in the main proceedings before 
the national court, the course of which is govemed by the pro-
cedural rules of nationallaw. A conflict of goals can arise in 
particular between the right of a lower court to make a refer-
ence and the procedural principle that it is bound by the judg-
ments of a higher court. For example, such a conflict arises 
when an appellate court quashes adecision of a lower court 
and remits the matter to that court for judgment, and under 
national procedurallaw the lower court is bound by the appel-
late court's finding oflaw. Such a situation gave rise to the two 
56. Id. at 281, 282, para. 5; ... also Minutere Public v. Asjes ("Nouvdle. 
Frontieres"), Cases 209-213/84, 1986 E.C.R. -. Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) , 14,287 
(reference for preliminary ruling from Ibe Pretura, Bra); FogliD tI. Nwello 11, Case 
244/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3045, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (ceH) , 8786. 
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Rheinmiihlen Düsseldoif cases,57 which concerned Paragraph 
126(5) of the Gennan Finanzgerichtsordnung-the Rules of 
Procedure in the Finanzgerichte-under which the trial court 
is bound by the legal ruling of the appellate court. 
In those judgments, the Court emphasized the decisive 
importance of Article 177 in preserving the unity of Commu-
nity law. That unity would be endangered if the lower court 
could be prevented, because it is bound on points oflaw by the 
rulings of the superior court from referring matters to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling. The lower court must there-
fore be free-if it considers that the ruling on law made by the 
superior court could lead it to give a judgment contrary to 
Community law--to decide to refer to the Court questions on 
which there is doubt. 
2. Review by the Court of Justice 
Review by the Court depends upon the principles just 
stated. The national court bears the responsibility fo.r the 
eventual judgment in the case and must decide, considering 
the facts of the case, whether or not it is necessary to obtain a 
preliminary ruling. However, there are inherent limits to the 
national court's power of appraisal that arise from the nature 
of the preliminary reference procedure itself, the observance 
ofwhich is subject to review by the Court. It must be borne in 
mind that in proceedings under Article 177, the Court may 
rule only on questions of Community law, and that a prelimi-
nary ruling can only be requested by a court in the course of 
judiciaI proceedings. The Court has inferred from those prin-
ciples that a reference for a preliminary ruling is only admissi-
ble if it concerns a question of Community law of the kind re-
ferred to in Article 177 which has arisen in the course of a gen-
uine legal dispute. If one of those conditions is not met the 
Court has repeatedly held that it has no jurisdiction to enter-
tain the question referred. This was the case, for example, 
with a question f'egarding the treatment under French social 
welf are law of a payment made under the German Bundesent-
57. Rheinmühlen Düsseldorfv. Einfuhr- und Vorrat.steUe für Getreide und Fut-
termittel, Case 166/7~. 1974 E.C.R. 53. Comm. M1r.t. Rep. (CCH) • 8265; 
Rheinmühlen - Düsseldorfv. Einfuhr - und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermit-
tel, ea.e 146/7~. 1974 E.C.R. 1119, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) • 8266. 
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schädigungs gesetz. 58 
The same line of reasoning was subsequently followed in 
two decisions on references for preliminary rulings by the act-
ing judge at the Tribunal d'Instance of Hayange. In the first 
case, the judge asked the following question: "What protec-
tion does the Treaty afford with regard to observance of the 
fundamental principle of the independence of the judiciary in 
the application of the law?"59 The main proceedings con-
cemed a legal dispute which had arisen out of a traffic accident 
in France in which only French nationals were involved. In the 
second case, an action for the eviction of tenants, the judge 
asked whether an action against hirn for damages for a denial 
of justice was compatible with "the requirements inherent in 
the very nature of Community law applicable to this case."60 
In both cases, the Court held that it clearly had no jurisdiction 
to reply to the questions referred, since it was apparent from 
the grounds and wording of the decisions making the refer-
ences that the questions did "not in an)' way relate either to the 
interpretation of the EEC Treaty or to the validity or interpre-
tation of an act of a Community institution."61 
The judgment in Mattheus v. Doego 62 follows the same ap-
proach. In that case the Amtsgericht in Essen had referred a 
number of questions on the interpretation of Article 237 ofthe 
EEC Treaty (admission of new Member States to the Commu-
nity). In essence, it asked whether or not there were reasons 
based on Community law making the accession of Spain, Por-
tugal, and Greece (1978) impossible in the foreseeable future. 
The Court declined jurisdiction on the ground that the legal 
conditions of such accession must first be delineated in the 
context of a well-defined procedure, that is, in political negoti-
58. jacob Adl.,rblum v. Caiss., Nationale d' Assuranc., Vieillesse des Travailleurs 
Salaries, Case 95/75, 1975 E.C.R. 2147, paras. 1-4, Comm. Mb. Rep. (CCH) 11-
(Cederallaw on compensation Cor viclims of Nazi persecution). 
59. Preliminary ruling by Ihe Actingjudge allhe Tribunal d'lnstance, Hayange, 
Case 105/79, 1979 E.C.R. 2257, 2257, Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH) 11-. 
60. Reference Cor a Preliminary ruling by Ihe Acting judge at Ihe Tribunal 
d'lnstance, Hayange, Cas" 68/80, 1980 E.C.R. 771, 771, Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH) , 
61. Order of Ihe Coun 27 JUD" 1979, Gase 105/79, 1979 E.C.R. 2257, Comm. 
Mltt. Rep. (CCH), -; Ord.,r oflhe Coun 12 March 1980, Gase 68/80,1980 E.C.R. 
771, Comm. Mb. Rep. (CCH) , -. 
62. Lothar Matlheus v. Doego Fruchtimpon und Tulkühlltost eG, Cas., 95/78, 
1978 E.C.R. 2205, paras. 4.7, Comm. MkL Rep. (CCH) , 8517. 
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ations, so that it was not possible to detennine their content 
judicially in advance.6S Tbe reasoning ofthe Court in that case 
(which shows careful adherence to the "political question doc-
trine") may lie in the fact that ArticIe 237 does not nonnally 
have consequences for a private contract and the parties can-
not create such consequences by agreement. The parties to 
the action before the national court should not be able to com-
pel the Court to make a highly political statement regarding 
the fundamental organization of the Community unless it is 
necessary. 
The Court also pays strict attention to the question of 
whether or not its answer will serve to resolve a genuine dis-
pute. It considers in that regard that the duty assigned to it by 
Article 177 is not that of delivering purely advisory opinions 
on general or hypothetical questions.64 The Court should not 
be confused with a legal adviser who may be asked at will for 
legal information. That concept was emphasized in the two Fo-
g/ia v. Novello cases, in which an Italian court, the Pretura di 
Bra, referred to the Court a number of questions regarding the 
compatibility with Community law of a French tax. The Court 
held that the questions referred did not fall within the frame-
work of the duties of the Court under Article 177 and there-
fore dedined jurisdiction.65 
Tbe key reason for judgment was the finding that the ac-
tion involved a fictitious dispute or an artiflcial device contrary 
tothe nonnal division of jurisdiction between the courts of the 
various Member States and between those courts and the 
Court ofJustice.66 In the Court's view, the parties agreed as to 
the result sought. and they intended, by means of a contract 
governed by private law, to induce tbe Court to give a judg-
ment that was not in fact necessary and to evade the jurisdic-
tion of the French courts. It appears from tbe facts of the case 
that in their submissions to the Court, both parties to tbe main 
proceedings described the alleged discrimination in 'French tax 
611. Id. at 2211, para. 7. 
64. FogIia u. NtnJe//Q /I, Case 244/80, 1981 E.G.R. at 3045, para. 18; susupra nOle 
IS. 
65. Pasqua1e Foglia v. Mariel1a Novello, Cue 104/79, 1980 E.G.R. 745, paras. 
1l.12, Gomm. Mkl. Rep. (CCH) , 8659 (Foglia u. NfJW//Q l); FogIia u. NtnJelltJ 1/, Case 
244/80, 1981 E.C.R. 3045, para •. 32-34, Gomm. Mltl. Rep. (GCH) , 8786. 
66. FogIia u. N.u.1ItJ 1/, 1981 E.G.R. al 3061, para. 13. 
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law in substantially the same terms and agreed that the tax reg-
ulation in question should be mIed contrary to Community 
law: 
It must in fact be emphasized that the duty assigned to 
the Court by Artic1e 177 is not that of delivering advisory 
opinions on general or hypothetical questions but of assist-
ing in the administration ofjustice in the Member States. 1t 
accordingly does not have jurisdiction to reply to questions 
of interpretation which are submitted to it within the frame-
work of procedural devices arranged by the parties in order 
to induce the Court to give its views on certain problems of 
Community law which do not correspond to an objective 
requirement inherent in the resolution of a dispute. A dec-
laration by the Court that it has no jurisdiction in such cir-
cumstances does not in any way trespass upon the preroga-
tives of the national court but makes it possible to prevent 
the application of the procedure under Artic1e 177 for pur-
poses other !han those appropriate for it. 
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that, whilst the 
Court of Justice must be able to place as much reliance as 
possible upon the assessment by the national court of the 
extent to which the questions submitted are essential, it 
must be in a position to make any assessment inherent in 
the performance of its own duties in particular in order to 
check, as all courts must, whether it has jurisdiction.67 
These judgments caused something of a sensation in legal 
circles. Although they may seem revolutionary at first glance, 
however, their practical effect should not be overestimated. 
They concerned a case of a rare and exceptional nature. The 
Court was opposed above all to manipulation of the procedure 
by the parties contrary to the spirit and intent of the judicial 
cooperation provided for by the Treaty. Such manipulations 
must not be peimitted to turn the preliminary reference proce-
dure into a surreptitious infringement procedure. It would 
certainly be wrong, therefore, to see in these judgments a ten-
dency on the part of the Court to place restrictions on the ref-
erence procedures, or a new departure in its jurispmdence. 
Indeed, the "fictitious dispute" argument has been made in 
subsequent proceedings, but the Court has never again ap-
67. 111. at 5062-63. parat. 18-19. 
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plied the principle developed in Foglia v. Novello.68 However, 
in borderline cases, national courts would be weil advised, 
when making a reference for a preliminary ruling, to add a 
statement of the reasons which have led them in that particular 
case to refer a question whose scope seems to go beyond the 
legal issue necessary for the decision of the case. 
Apart from the cases discussed in which the reference for 
a preliminary ruling dearly did not concern Community law or 
did not arise out of a genuine dispute, the Court has dedined 
to entertain references only in cases where the reference to the 
provision of Community law in question was clearly incor-
rect,69 and the real subject matter ofthe reference could not be 
ascertained from the reasons stated in the decision making the 
reference or from the documents before the Court. In such a 
case it would be sheer fonnalism to provide an answer to the 
question referred. It would not help the national court in mak-
ing its decision. In such cases, the Court has not dedined ju-
risdiction but has limited itself to stating that in light of the 
factual and legal circumstances of the main proceedings "no 
reply need be given to the question referred by the national 
court, "70 or that "it is unnecessary for the Court to give a rul-
ing."7\ 
Such a practice is not of course intended to impinge upon 
the jurisdiction of the national court. Rather, it should be un-
derstood as a manifestation of the cooperative nature of the 
preliminary reference procedure-cooperation that would be 
entirely ladung if a ruling were made which dearly would not 
assist the national court in reaching adecision. 
68. Micheie Bestini v. Regione Lazio, Cases 98/162 and 258/85,1986 E.C.R.-
(paras. 5-8 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 45,358; SpA Vinal v. SpA 
Orbat, Case 46/80, 1981 E.C.R. 77, 91, para. 5, Comm. Mit!. Rep. (CCH) 'IJ 8724; 
Chemial Fannaceutici SpA v. DAF SpA, Case 140/79, 1981 E.C.R. I, 15, para. 7, 
Comm. Mb. Rep. (CCH) , 8725. 
69. q. Thomasdunger v. Obcrfinanzdirektion Frankfurt am Main, Case 166/84, 
1985 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mb. Rep. (CCH) , -; SpA S .. lgoil v. ltalian Ministry for 
Foreign Trade, Case 15/68, 1968 E.C.R. 455, 459·60, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) W 
8072. 
70. Rijksdienst Voor Werknemerspensioenen v. Alice V1aeminck, Case 132/81, 
1982 E.C.R. 2955, 2964, Comm. Mkt. Rcp. (CCH) , -. 
71. Celestri Ic Co. SpAv. Ministry ofFrance, Case 172/84, 1985 E.C.R. - (para. 
17 of the judgment), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 -; cf.' C. WRIGHT, supra note 16, 
U 52-52A, at 502-30 (discussion of abstention doetrin"s). 
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B. The Duty of Courts 0/ Last Instance to Make References 
The only courts that are obliged to refer questions are 
those against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy 
under national law, that is, courts of last instance.72 Other 
courts are simply entitled to make references. The Treaty 
merely ensures that they have the assistance of the Court of 
Justice when for reasons of expediency they wish it to darify a 
preliminary question of Community law. The question of 
whether or not a court decides at last instance is thus the crite-
rion that determines whether or not a court entitled to make 
references is obliged to do so under the third paragraph of Ar-
tide 177. 
1. The Meaning of the Term "Court of Last Instance" 
In academic cirdes there is some controversy over 
whether the term "court of last instance" is to be understood 
in a conerete (functional) or abstract (institutional) sense. Ac-
cording to the abstract (institutional) approach, only the high-
est courts in the judicial hierarchy are obliged to make refer-
ences.7! According to the concrete (functional) approach, on 
the other hand, the duty to make a reference is determined by 
the nature of the proceedings in the particular case. It relates 
not to the position of the relevant court in the judicial hierar-
chy but rather to the nature ofthe decision to be made. Along 
72. EEC Treaty,supra note I, art. 177, para. !I (courts oflast instance are thost! 
after which there is no judicial remedy). 
7!1. The following courts may be regarded as hierarchically highest in the Euro· 
pean Community Member States (except Spain and Portugal): 
Belgium: Cour de Cassalion; Conseil d'Etal. 
Dmmark: Hojesteret. 
FtdmU &public 0/ Gmnan,: Bundesverfassungsgericht; Bundesgerichshof; 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht; BundesarbeitsgerichI; Bundesfinanzhof; 
Bunde.sozialgericht. 
G ...... : Asrio. Pagos (Court oe Cassation); Symboulio Epikratias (Council 
of State); AnotalO Idiko Dikastrio (Supreme Special Court). 
Fra_: Cour de Cassation; Conseil d'Etat. 
Irtland: Supreme Court. 
II4l,: Cone CostituzionaJe; Cone Suprema di Cassazione; Consiglio di 
Stato. 
~ Cour de Cassation; Conseil d'Etat. 
N.IItnImub: Hoge llaad; Ilaad van Stale; Centrale llaad van Beroep; Col· 
lege van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven; Tariefcommissie. 
UrtiUd Kitogdom: House oe Lord.; Privy Council. 
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with the courts "at the top of the judicial pyramid" it is argued 
that Article 177 applies to courts "which must from time to 
time give final decisions, but only in such cases,"'· that is, 
where because of the nature of the dispute of which it is seised 
(for example, the amount at issue) there is no appeal from its 
decision. That can in practice give rise to problems of delimi-
tation, for example. where it is not clear from the outset 
whether or not it will be possible to appeal from the decision 
to be given (e.g .• where a specific sum must be attained before 
an appeal is possible. or where leave to appeal must be ob-
tained from that court itself or from the appeal court). 
The concrete theory has in its favor the fact that it ensures 
that individual rights are protected at all levels of the judicial 
hierarchy. The danger of divergent interpretations really 
arises only at the level of the courts of last instance. Such 
courts make decisions that cannot subsequently be modified. 
Only then can the incorrect interpretation and application of 
Community law have definitive harmful consequences for the 
individual. In contrast, in earlier stages of the proceedings, 
any errors on the part of the lower court may be raised in an 
appeal under national law and corrected by the superior 
courts. 
The advantage of the abstract theory, on the other hand, is 
that it prevents the Court from being overloaded with pro-
ceedings of minor importance. It is oriented less to the protec-
tion oflegal rights than to the necessity of protecting the integ-
rity of the legal system. The decisions of the highest courts 
clearly have a far-reaching effect as precedents. They infiuence 
trends in the lower courts and thus constitute the "hard core" 
of national case law.75 Discrepancies, differences of opinion, 
and the resulting legal uncertainty at that level seriously en-
danger the unity and existence of the Community legal order. 
The Court ofJustice has not yet clearly decided the issue, 
but seems inclined toward the concrete approach. Indications 
of that may be found in particular in the Court's judgment in 
Costa v. ENEL on a reference from the Giudice Conciliatore, 
74. G. VANDERSANDEN Be A. BAJlAY. CoNTElmEUX COMMUNAUTAIRE 281 (1977). 
75. Srl C.I.L.F.I.T. Be Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministf}' of Heahh. Case 
28S/81. 1982 E.C.R. M15. M52, M40. para. 8, Comm. Mt!. Rep. (CCH) , 8875 
(opinion of Adv0C3te General Capotoni). 
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2. The Scope of the Duty to Make References 
The scope of the duty of courts of last instance to make 
references has been the object of doctrinal debate since the 
Community's inception. Academic opinion is virtually unani-
mous in holding that there is no duty to make a reference when 
there can be no reasonable doubt as to the validity or interpre-
tation of the relevant Community law. That conclusion finds 
some support in the wording of the second paragraph of Arti-
c1e 177, according to which the courts of the Member States 
may only refer questions to the Court if they consider that the 
Court's ruling "is necessary." 
To support their position, commentators generally refer 
to the acte ,lai,. doctrine, derived from the French legal system. 
Concern for the orderly administration of justice requires that 
the courts refl,1se to permit dilatory tactics that would unneces-
sarily prolong the proceedings. It is argued, therefore, that a 
reference for a preliminary ruling should be considered only if 
there is real difficulty in ascertaining the contem and scope of 
Community law. 
The acte ,lai,. doctrine arose in France in connection with 
the principle of separation oe powers between the executive 
and the judiciary in the interpretation and application of inter-
national treaties. The interpretation of such treaties is re-
served to the executive, because it bears the responsibility at 
. the international level. The courts may only apply them. If 
interpretation is necessary, courts must ask the Ministry ofFor-
eign Affairs for an official and authoritative clarification of the 
76. F1aminio Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585, Comm. Mkl. Rep. 
(CCH) 1 8025. The Coun of Justiee has held on more than one occuion that the 
duty of couns ofla.t instance tO make references arise. only in substantive proceed-
ings and not in proceedings for interim measures or interlocutory injunctions; in 
such case. tbe panies remain at libeny 10 make tbe appropriate submissions in Ihe 
main proceedings. The requiremenu arising from the purpose of Aniele 177 are 
observed a.s regards summary proceedings where "ordinary proceedings as to the 
substance, pennitting the re-examination of any question of Community law prov;-
sionally decided in tbe summary proceedings, must be inslituted either in all circum-
stances or when the unsuccessful pany so requires." Hoftinann-La Roche v. Cen-
traf arm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, Case I07n6, 
1977 E.C.R. 957, para. 5, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (ceH) 1 8414; Elestina Chrislina Mor-
son v. Stale of the Netherlands " Hnd of tbe Plaatselijke Politie, Joined Ca.ses 55 " 
56/82, 1982 E.C.R. 5725, para. 8, Comm. Mkl. Rep. (CCH) 'l8876. 
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provisions of the treaty in question. Ta restrict the role of the 
executive and limit its inßuence on their judgments, the courts 
developed the acte clair doctrine, thus retaining the power to 
determine whether or not genuine difficulties of interpretation 
exist and recovering a broad margin of discretion.77 
In the 1960s, the French Conseil d'Etat and-to a lesser 
extent-the Cour de Cassation used the acte cLair doctnne to 
curtail the scope of their obligation to make references under 
the third paragraph of Article 177. That enabled them to sub-
stitute their own interpretation of Community law for the in-
terpretation of the Court. 78 
As a result, the highest courts of a number of other Mem-
ber States rallied to the acte clair doctrine. In one case the Ger-
man Bundesverwaltungsgericht refused to refer a question to 
the Court on the ground that the material provision of Com-
munity law was not in question. There was no room for inter-
pretation, the German court reasoned, "since this provision 
does not need interpretation."79 
Commentators on European law, however, have largely 
rejected the acte clair doctrine. It is genel·aUy recognized that 
the duty to make a reference does not extend to questions to 
which an impartial lawyer could reasonably give only one an-
swer. It is objected, however, that the overly hasty acceptance 
of such a practice would inevitably weaken the duty to make 
references and thus undennine the preliminary reference pro-
cedure. A matter cannot be assumed to be "dear" simply be-
cause the national court believes that it can be subjectively cer-
tain of the content of the relevant Community law, hut only 
where, objectively speaking. there is no doupt at all as to the 
validity and meaning of the rule of law in question. Although 
the right to make references depends on the subjective opinion 
of the national court, attention must still be focused on the 
objective circumstances. Otherwise, the scope of the duty to 
77. C./.LF./.T., Case 288/81. 1982 E.C.R. S432, 3435, Comm. MkL Rep. (CCH) 
, 8875 (opinion of Advocale General Capolorti). 
78. Conseil d·Etal: SHELL BERRE 344 (19M); SYNDICAT NATIONAL DES bi-
PORTATEURS FRANetAlS EN PRODrrs LAmERs 41 (l967); SYNDICAT DES IMPORTATEURS 
DE VETEMENTS ET PRODUlTS ARTISANAUX 209 (l979) ()uri.prudence); Cour de Cassa-
lion: LAnYRE 465 (I967) ()urisprudence); Pieron &: Dufour, BULLETIN DES ARRETS 
DE LA COUR DE CAsSATION 692 (Chambre Criminelle, 1975); stt also L.-J. CONSTAN-
TINESCO, DAS RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 881 (1977). 
79. Judgment of 14 Feb. 1969, 51 Enlsch. BverwG. 279,284. 
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make references would depend on anational court's self-confi-
dence and its readiness to make decisions. This might foster 
the manipulation of the duty to make references by courts ac-
customed to making decisions independently, thus frustrating 
the objective of thal duty: thepreservation of the unity of 
Community law. 
In its Da Costa judgment, the Court expressed the view 
that the duty to make references under paragraph 3 of Artide 
177 is in principle unrestricted and admits of exception only 
where in a particular case the authority of a ruling already 
given by the Court in a similar case may "deprive the obliga-
tion of its purpose and thus empty it of its substance."80 
That point of view was further developed and qualified in 
the C.l.LF./. T. judgment.81 The main point of the question 
referred was whether and to what extent the existence of an 
obligation to make a reference under paragraph 3 of Artide 
177 depended "on the prior finding of a reasonable interpreta-
tive doubt. "82 In its ruling the Court at last defined the scope 
and limits of the duty of courts of last instance to make refer-
ences both generally and in the context of the case, and in do-
ing so laid down the following main criteria: (i) Article 177 of 
the Treaty does not constitute a means of redress available to 
the parties to the proceedings before a national court. There-
fore, the mere fact that a party contends that the dispute gives 
rise to a question conceming the interpretation of Community 
law does not mean that a national court is obliged to make a 
reference. Where necessary, however, it may refer a matter to 
the Court of Justice on its own motion. (ii) Because the ques-
tion of the necessity of the reference is a matter for the juris-
diction of a national court, it is not obliged to make a reference 
if the question raised is not relevant, that is, if the answer to 
that question can in no way affect the outcome ofthe case. Nor 
is a national court obliged to make a reference where previous 
decisions of the Court of Justice have already dealt with the 
point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the pro-
ceedings which led to those decisions, even though the ques-
80. DG Cosla, Joined Cases 28-SO/62, 1968 E.C.R. 31, 88, Comm. Mb. Rep. 
(CCH) , 8010, at 7289. 
81. C./.LF./.T" Case 288/81, 1982 E.C.R. 8482, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (ceH) , 
8875. 
82. /d. at 8482, para. I. 
570 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 10:538 
tions at issue are not strictly identical to those already re-
solved. (iii) Finally. there is no obligation to make a refer-
ence when "the correct application of Community Law [is) so 
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the 
manner in which the question raised is to be resolved." That 
statement iso however. restricted by the necessity of ensuring 
that the threshold of reasonable doubt is defined according to 
objective criteria. and that the specific difficulties of interpret-
ing Community law (legislation drafted in several languages. 
new terminology. determination of context) are borne in mind. 
The central test is whether or not there is a risk that a court in 
another Member State or the Court of Justice may give a differ-
ent decision.83 
V. THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF PRELIMINARY RULINGS 
The preliminary ruling takes the form of a judgrnent. 
which in its form and content reßects the nonadversarial na-
ture of the preliminary reference procedure. The fact that the 
dispute ofwhich the national court is seised mere1y defines the 
factual context in regard to which the Court makes an abstract 
statement ofthe law. Thejudgment contains the answer to the 
question referred, that is, a statement regarding the validity or 
interpretation of the rule of Community law in question. 
A. Efficts in the Main Proceedings 
The preliminary ruling is dearly binding in its effect on 
the proceedings that prompted the national court to make the 
reference. It is binding not only on the court making the refer-
ence but also on any other court in the Member State con-
cemed which is called upon to make adecision in the same 
case. It is therefore binding on the appellate court, when the 
reference for a preliminary ruling was made by a lower court in 
the exercise of its right under the second paragraph of Article 
177. It mayaIso be binding on a lower court to which the case 
is remitted for judgment by the appellate court, irrespective of 
wh ether the reference was made by the appellate court itself or 
by the lower court against whose decision an appeal was 
brought. 
83. Case 283/81. 1982 E.C.R. MI!i. 3428-80. paras. 5-16. Comm. Mkl. Rep. 
(CCH) 'l 8875. 
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The fact that the pre1iminary ruling is binding in the main 
proceedings means that the competent national courts must 
decide the dispute of which they are seised on the basis of the 
interpretation given by the Court ofJustice. They may not de-
part from the Court's ruling. In short, they must apply the rule 
of Community law in question as interpreted by the Court, or 
must refrain from applying a rule of law held invalid. That 
does not mean, however, that the competent national courts 
are obliged to apply the Community rule in question as inter-
preted by the Court where they subsequently come to the con-
clusion (perhaps on the basis of the answer given by the Court 
itself) that the rule oflaw in question is not relevant to the case 
before them. Under the division of competence in the prelim~ 
inary reference procedure, such questions of relevance fall 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national court. 
In practice, problems can arise over the question whether 
the Court's ruling on a matter of Community law is also appli-
cable to circumstances that arose prior to the date of the pre-
liminary ruling. Generally, a preliminary ruling has effect ex 
tune. However, for reasons of legal certainty, the Court has in 
exceptional cases held that its ruling should have effect ex nunc. 
hoth in cases of invalidity and (contrary to previous practice) 
with regard to the interpretation of Community regulations. 
Tbe limitation of the temporal validity of a ruling is only 
possible in the actual judgment giving the ruling. Tbe funda-
mental need for a general and uniform application of Commu-
nity law implies that it is for the Court alone to decide whether 
the interpretation which it lays down should be limited in 
time.84 
Only in rare cases has the Court limited the application of 
preliminary rulings temporally. On each occasion the ruling 
concerned a regulation with important financial implications. 
Tbe retroactive application of the ruling would in a multitude 
of individual cases have given rise to claims for the repayment 
of sums improperly charged and for the payment of sums un-
paid. It also would have required the re-settlement of a great 
number of public law and private law transactions, some of 
84. Amminislrazione delle Finanze v. 5.r.1. Meridionale Indwllria 5alumi. 
Fralelli Vasanelli k Fralelli U1lrocchi, Joined Cases 66, 127 B< 128/79, 1980 E.C.R. 
1287, 1261, para. 11, Comm. MI". Rep. (CCHI , 8668. 
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them going far into the past. That would have had unjustifi-
able economic consequences for the economic operators con-
cemed, and would have endangered the smooth functioning of 
the Common Market. 
In DeJrennt v. Sabena,85 in which a ruling that the principle 
of equal pay for men and women (Artide 119 of the EEC 
Treaty) had direct effect was held inapplicable to past circum-
stances, the Court justified the limitation of the temporal effect 
of its judgment: 
As the general level at which pay would have been fixed can-
not be known, important considerations of legal certainty 
affecting all the interests involved, both public and private, 
make it impossible in principle (0 re-open the question as 
regards the past. Therefore, the direct elfect of Article 119 
cannot be relied on in order to support claims conceming 
pay periods prior to the date of this judgment, except as 
regards those workers who have' alreadl;; brought legal pro-
ceedings or made an equivalent claim. 
In Defrennt, the Court made an exception to the general denial 
of retroactive effect in favor of the plaintiff in the main pro-
ceedings. That aspect of the judgment has not, however, been 
consistently followed. In a number of more recent decisions, 
the Court has held instead that its ruling that certain provi-
sions of Community law (regarding the fixing of monetary 
compensatory amounts) were invalid should have no retroac-
tive effect whatsoever, even with regard to the parties to the 
main proceedings.87 
B. Effoct a.r Precedents 
Tbe generally accepted view is that a preliminary ruling is 
directly binding only with regard to the proceedings in which 
85. Gabri.,lI., Defrenn<: v. Societe Anonym., Beige de Navigation Amenne 
Sabena, Cast: 4,n5, 1976 E.C.R. 455, Comm. Mltl. Rep. (CCH) , 8'46. 
86. /d. at 481, para. 75. 
87. "Sodi:re Cooperalive" Providence Agricole de Ja Champagne v. Office Na-
tionallnterprofessionnel des Cereales (ONJC), Cue 4179, 1980 E.C.R. 2825, 285l1. 
Comm. Mxt. Rep. (CCH) '8716; Sari Malsene. de Beauce v. Office National Inter-
professionnel des areales (ONIC), Case 109179, 1980 E.C.R. 2885, 2915, Comm. 
Mltt. Rep. (CCH) , 8717: SA Roquette Freres v. Frenc:h Slale - Customs Administra-
tion, Case 145/79, 1980 E.C.R. 2917, 2946, Comm. Mkl. Rep. (CCH) • 8718. For 
lhe most recent case law on that position, see Pietro Pinlla v. Cai.s., d'A1locations 
Familiales de la Savoie, Cast 41/84, 1986 E.C.R. -, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CeH) '-. 
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the reference was made. That does not, however, preclude the 
possibility that recourse may be had to the solution set out in 
one preliminary ruling in other proceedings dealing with the 
same or similar questions of Community Iaw. The preliminary 
ruling can then be said to function as a model or precedent. 
That concept found expression as early as 1963 in the Da 
Costa case,88 in which the Court of Justice simply referred the 
national court to the answer which it had given two months 
before in the Van Gend & Loos judgment,89 because there were 
no new facts which might affect its decision. 
Some commentators criticized this course of action, ob-
jecting that the Court of Justice should have repeated the an-
swer it had given in the Van Gend & Loos judgment. Indeed, 
further examination of the case would have induced many 
other courts to refer the same question. Courts of last in-
Stance, obliged to refer questions under the third paragraph of 
Article 177, would certainly have considered it a formalistic 
and pettifogging attitude. To refer a question that has already 
heen decided simply prolongs the proceedings unnecessarily 
and multiplies (he costs. Finally, renewed consideration ofthe 
circumstances would have prejudiced the Court's role as the 
authoritative interpreter ofCommunity law. At the same time, 
the Da Costa judgment does include an important clarification: 
nothing prevents national courts from referring for a second 
time questions 01 interpretation which have already been decided 
in a similar case.90 
The Court reserves the right to depart from its previous 
judgments in appropriate circumstances. This accords not 
only with the dynamic nature ofCommunity law, which implies 
that the Court cannot consider itself bound by its own judg-
ments, hut also with the cooperative function of the procedure, 
which requires that national courts always be able to refer to 
the Court new elements offact or law. On the other hand, the 
principles of legal certainty and the uniformity of Community 
88. D4 CosIa.Joincd Ca,,,, 28-~0/62, 1965 E.C.R. SI. Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 
'8010. 
89. N.V. Algemene Transpon·en Expeditie Ondememing van Gend 8c 1.00, .. 
Ncderlandse administratie der belastingen (NHherJands Inland Revenue Administra-
tion), Cas" 26/62,1965 E.C.R. I, Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH)' 8008. 
90. 1965 E.C.R. at ~I. "Anicle 177 a1ways alJowsa national coun, ifit considen 
it d"sirabl", to refer qu"stions of interpretation to th" Coun agam." 14. 
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Law require that the cOUJ:ts of the Member States, induding 
those which are not obliged to make references under the third 
paragraph of Artic1e 177, not independently depart from an 
earlier decision of the Court but make a new reference if they 
wish to base their decision on a different view of the law. 
The value of preliminary rulings as precedents may thus 
be compared with the effect of decisions of the highest courts 
in nationallaw. Aside from the special case of Anglo-American 
common law and the normative effect of certain judgments of 
constitutional courts, even leading decisions of the highest na-
tional courts are not directly binding outside the context of the 
dispute which gave rise to them. They are, however, a de facto 
source oflaw, since in practice their impact necessarily goes far 
beyond the specific case in hand. 
The same is true of preliminary rulings made in proceed-
ings to ascertain the validity of Community legal measures. It 
is dear from the difference in terminology between the term 
"void" used in connection with direct actions under Artide 
174 of the EEC Treaty and the term "validity" used in Article 
177, that a declaration ofvalidity or invalidity in the context of 
a preliminary ruling has no directly binding effect erga omnes. 
This is confirmed by the differing objectives of the action for 
nuIlity and the preliminary reference on questions ofvalidity. 
Tbe limited legal effect of preliminary rulings declaring 
contes ted Community regulations valid may be seen in the 
careful wording of such decisions. Tbe judgment is usually 
worded as folIows: "Consideration of the question raised has 
disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of 
Article ... ofRegulation (Directive, etc.) .... " In other words, 
in preliminary rulings the Court does not claim to have ex-
amined all possible objections that might be raised to the va-
lidity of the provision or measure in question. As a rule, it lim-
its itself to consideration of the arguments made before it and 
of certain points that it must take into account ex officio. A 
decision of this kind does not predude the possibility that the 
provision or measure in question may be invalid for reasons 
other than those already examined. 
In theory the position is the same when a Community 
measure is declared invalid. In principle there is no reason 
why the Court should not reverse its previous decisions. It 
1987] ART/CLE 177 EEC TREATY 575 
would be difficult, however, to reconcile such a course of ac-
tion with the principle ofprotection oflegitimate expectations. 
From a praetical point ofview, it is therefore inconeeivable that 
the Court, having onee held a rule oflaw invalid, would subse-
quently deelare it valid after further consideration. 
A declaration that a rule of Community law is invalid must 
therefore be followed by an national courts, even though the 
judgment in question is not directly binding on them. Natu-
rally, a new reference may also be made in such a ease. For 
reasons of proeedural economy. however. such action should 
be eonsidered only in exceptional cases, for instance, when fur-
ther information is desired regarding the reasons for the deela-
ration of invalidity, its seope or its legal effects. 
CONCLUSION 
Tbe essence of the preliminary ruling procedure lies in the 
spirit of mutual trust and eooperation which exists between the 
national courts and the Court of Justice. It is reflected in the 
frank and vigorous dialogue that takes place between the 
Court and the national courts, in the appreeiation that both 
sides show for each other's problems and diffieulties, and in 
lheir respect for the differentjurisdictions. In that connection, 
the role of the national courts cannot be overemphasized. Tbe 
effectiveness of the proeedure and thus the permanent uni-
formity and eoherenee of the Community legal order depends 
on the responsible collaboration of the national courts. 
Of course, conHiets regarding jurisdiction and disagree-
ments eannot always be avoided. They are not peculiar to the 
proeedure, however. Such disagreements also arise within na-
tional legal orders, particularly when several judicial branches 
co-exist independently. Any differences of opinion between 
the Court and the national courts are all the more understand-
able because Community law has developed eoncepts whieh do 
not exist in all the legal orders of the Member States or at least 
are not given the same meaning and weight. Some examples 
of this are the general principles of Community law that the 
Court has developed, such as the principles of the protection 
of legitimate expectations, of legal certainty and of proportion-
ality, or certain aspects of the jurisprudence on civil rights 
("fundamental rights") in the context of the Community. 
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Although those concepts are also recognized in one form or 
another as a component of the democratic and legal society 
existing in all the Member States. there are often significant 
differences in the scope and weight attached to them in the 
individual national legal orders. In particular. supreme courts 
that work on the basis of settled legal traditions and prindples 
need time to adjust to the new methods which they are re-
quired to adopt in dealing with Community law. 
The Court is still occasionally seen as a body that threat-
ens the jUrisdiction of the national courts and not as one that 
provides support and assistance in the fulfillment of their du-
des. This is seen in national courts' reliance on the acte c/air 
doctrine. in the formthat questions take. and in the length of 
the procedure. 
Courts of last instance. deliberately or unconsciously. 
shelter behind the useful acte c/air doctrine to evade their duty 
to make references to the Court. Other courts justify their in-
clination to decide cases on their own by citing the optional 
nature of references in relation to proceedings pending before 
them. In addition, the tendency of many courts to avoid. 
where possible. a procedure in which they do not have suffi-
dent confidence. is often encouraged by the attitude of the 
parties to the proceedings. For these parties. the intennediate 
procedure before the Court represents an unnecessary prolon-
gation of the proceedings or an additional element of uncer-
tainty. These parties often reIy on Community law without giv-
ing proper thought to the matter and without providing the 
national court with a sound basis for its decision. 
Misunderstandings and therefore confiicts can also arise 
from the inadequate formulation of the questions submitted to 
the Court. These questions either do not respect the limits 
placed on the Court's jurisdiction in preliminary ruling pro-
ceedings or do not bring out the true legal problem arising 
from the case sufficiently clearly. Thus the Court is repeatedly 
faced with questions from courts with insufficient knowledge of 
Community law which, because they are formulated in terms 
which are too specific, fall under the sphere of the application. 
rather than that the interpretation. ofCommunity law. On the 
other hand, the courts occasionally strive so hard to be abstract 
(hat in the absence of suffidently clear references to the facts in 
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the main proceedings, the question is incomprehensible, and it 
is impossible to give a reply that may help to settle the dispute. 
The length of the procedure obstructs fruitful cooperation 
between the national courts and the Court of Justice. 
Although the average length of the preliminary ruling proce-
dure-approximately one year from the registration of the re-
quest for a preliminary ruling and the judgment-is clearly 
shorter than the periods required by national supreme courts 
in appeal or cassation proceedings, it can, particularly in con-
nection with small cases, deter a court that is in principle will-
ing to make a reference. 
The Court has made every effort with all the means at its 
disposal to keep the length of the procedure as short as possi-
ble. A frequent source of delay, the notorious overburdening 
of the full Court, was removed at least in part by the amend-
ment to the Rules of Procedure in 1979. That amendment 
provided for easier assignment of cases to Chambers.91 There 
are, however, certain technical obstacles to introducing further 
measures to reduce the length of the procedure. Because the 
main working language and the language of deliberation of the 
Court is traditionally French, ifnecessary a11 the relevant docu-
ments must be translated into that language, irrespective ofthe 
language of the case. Additionally, it does not appear possible 
to reduce the two-month period for the submission of written 
observations92 in view of the fact that the parties often submit 
very extensive observations. Finally, the complex administra-
tive apparatus of the Member States and the Community insti-
tutions requires a certain amount of time to reach the political 
decision of principle on which their observations are based. 
91. Rul.,. ofProcedure, an. 9&, O.J. 1979, No. L 238/1, S-4, Comm. Mkl. Rep. 
(CCH) , 4845. 
92. ProlOCOlon the Statute oftheCourt ofJwtice oe me EEC, art. 20, reprinledin 
Comm. Mltt. Rep. (CCH), 4751. 
